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THE PATENTABLE INVENTION
JOHN HOGG AUSTIN t
THE BASIS OF PATENT LAW AND THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
The law of inventions, or patent law, is the machinery by which the
domain of received public knowledge is enlarged through encouraging the
prompt contribution to the public of new ideas or knowledge and by con-
demning and penalizing the withholding of such knowledge from the public
by the inventor. Men are thus constrained to bring their new and useful
ideas to the public promptly or suffer the legal consequences.1 The patent
law condemns secret uses such as the Chamberlen family resorted to in
keeping the knowledge of forceps from the public for many generations,
thereby depriving humanity of the general use of an instrument valuable
in saving the lives of women and children at childbirth.
Frequently the progress of a whole field of knowledge is obstructed
until someone comes forward with one item of knowledge which removes
the obstacle. As soon as knowledge becomes public property, its possibilities
may then naturally develop within its particular field by receiving the atten-
tion of those working in that field. The progress of science and the useful
arts is promoted by promptly putting knowledge into the possession of the
public that it may grow and bear fruit.
The Constitution of the United States in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,
has given Congress power to bring this about in a specific manner, namely,
by granting to the inventor as an inducement to prompt disclosure the exclu-
sive use of his contribution for a limited period. This indicates the doc-
trinal basis which is to be developed. Congress has legislated and provided
for such a grant to the inventors who bring new ideas of certain types to
the public.2  But as a condition precedent to the grant, the inventor must
put the public sufficiently into possession of the idea that its possibilities will
be clearly understandable. It must, indeed, be so far understood as to con-
tribute to the sum of human knowledge, and be accessible to the public as an
established fact in the art. Congress therefore has expressly required, as a
prerequisite to the grant of a patent,3 a written description of the invention
in "full, clear, concise, and exact" words.
t United States Naval Academy, 1924; LL. B., 1929, University of Pennsylvania;
member of the Philadelphia Bar.
i. Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U. S. 5o (923) ; Vanore v. Improta, 25 F. (2d)
918 (App. D. C. 1928) ; MacBeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Elec. Co., 246 Fed. 695 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1917).
2. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. A. § 31 (1929), amended by 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35
U. S. C. A. § 31 (Supp. 1936).
3. 38 STAT. 958 (915), 35 U. S. C. A. §33 (1929), amended by 46 STAT. 376 (i930), 35
U. S. C. A. § 33 (Supp. 1936).
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This limited monopoly of seventeen years in itself aids in the promotion
of the progress of science and the useful arts,4 aside from its function as a
reward and inducement to inventors promptly to bring their inventions to
the public domain. The limited monopoly which is in a sense given in
exchange for the disclosure filed in the Patent Office invites the commercial
development and practical perfection of the invention because it offers
a reasonable inducement for the expenditure of capital during the prob-
lematic and non-productive period of speculative development. The benefits
and protection of the monopoly are instrumental in giving the invention a
start in overcoming strong prejudices in favor of the old and in combatting
deep antagonism to change by the introduction of a new invention. 5 This
artificial stimulus is necessary to bring home to an unsympathetic public a
full realization of the possibilities in an invention.6 Sir William Osler
recognized the difficulty in getting inventions accepted when he said, "In
science the credit goes to the man who convinces the world, not to the man
to whom the idea first occurs." 7
There is another way in which the monopoly stimulates development
industrially. The efforts to get around the monopoly, to evolve something
to compete with the invention, direct inventive attention and effort to the
new field and frequently new and better ideas emerge which surpass the
pioneer invention. Improvement begins long before the monopoly expires
because the public has full possession of the idea at the inception of the
monopoly for pure experimentation even though commercial and general
use is restricted.
Many countries further insure an early and prompt realization of the
possibilities of a new invention by attaching working requirements to the
patent grant. These working requirements appear in various forms, but
all are designed to prevent a patentee from standing in the road of practical
commercial development if he himself is unwilling or unable to practice
the invention. In some countries there is provision for a compulsory license
from one who is not working his invention; in other countries a forfeiture
may result from the failure to work the invention and benefit the public in
whose name the monopoly is given to the inventor. In the United States a
patentee need not practice his invention to preserve his monopoly,8 though
the justice of the working requirement is recognized in the rule that a paper
4. See Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U. S. 463, 466 (1924).
5. Such antagonism is graphically described by Judge Buffington in a survey of the devel-
opment of the glass-blowing art in Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 59 F.
(2d) 399 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
6. Willof, Patents in Modern Social Systems (1933) 15 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 985.
7. (1934) 16 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 82-83.
8. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 21o U. S. 405, 422-430
(igo8) ; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27, 31 (1931);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Co., 71 F. (2d) 539, 566 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
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patent, that is, one which has not been worked, will be strictly construed
and limited.9
This increase of the store of received public knowledge is the dominant
consideration at the root of the patent law, and the rewarding of an inventor,
however meritorious his efforts, is purely incidental and subordinate.' 0 It
is the putting of the public into possession of something it did not previously
enjoy that entitles one to a patent. A patent monopoly given only as a
reward for meritorious efforts was illegal at common law. Novelty is the
essential justification of the monopoly. When the monopoly is limited to a
novel contribution, the public is not deprived of anything that it had before
the inventor came forward with his idea."-
The principle that novelty is the justification of the monopoly appeared
early in the history of patent law. The monopoly in the early common law
was unlawful if it deprived the public of something it possessed before the
patentee's contribution was made. The odious monopoly lacked the basis
of novelty of subject matter. This principle was embodied in statutory
form in the famous statute against monopolies passed by Parliament in the
reign of James 1.12 The statute prohibited all monopolies except monopo-
lies "to the first and true inventor or inventors of such manufactures, which
others, at the time of the making of such letters patent and grants did not
use, as they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state". 3
This distinction in monopolies is sound and lies at the root of the patent
law. It was recognized both by common law and by statute at a time when
the abuse of the monopoly was at its worst. Even Soviet Russia, although
abolishing private property, retains a patent system for granting private
monopolies in the use of new inventions. 14  The patent right based on
novelty is the most dignified of property rights, for the patentee takes noth-
ing from the public but only gives. 1
9. Toledo Scale Co. v. Barnes Scale Co., 18 F. (2d) 965 (E. D. Mich. 1927).
io. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328 (U. S. 1858) ; Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 511 (1917); Vanore v. Improta, 25 F. (2d) 918,
923 (App. D. C. 1928).
ii. Costruzioni Meccaniche Canavesi v. Mavani and Ferrari, 34 PAT. & T. M. REv. 124
(Court of Appeals, Genoa, Italy, Feb. 1936), showing a full appreciation of the operation of
the principle of novelty to protect the public from being deprived of anything not contributed
by the inventor. To the same effect, see -TiENNE BLANC, TRAITk DE LA CONTREFACONr (4th
ed. 1855) 464.
12. 21 JAc. I, c. 3 (1623). See I ROBINsON, LAw OF PATENTS (1890) 3-67, for the his-
torical background of patent law.
13. 21 JAC. I, c. 3 (1623).
14. Willof, Patents in Modern Social Systems (1933) 15 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 985;
Olkovsky, Patents and Trade-Marks in the U. S. S. R. (935) 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC. 386;
Nikonov, Patents it; Soviet Russia (1935) 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 339.
15. See i WALKER, LAv OF PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) 258, which quotes from Francis
Bacon's Novuin Organum, Book I, § 129; United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289
U. S. 178, 186 (1933).
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The far-reaching effect of the principle of novelty is shown in the
history and the present law of the disclaimer.16 Before the disclaimer
statute, it was settled law that should a patent be found to claim more than
the novel invention, the whole patent was completely void. 17 Even under
the ameliorating disclaimer statute, the failure promptly to disclaim matter
not properly the subject of the monopoly voids the patent in its entirety.
The public should never have been deprived of it in the first place because
it was not novel and hence not part of the patentee's contribution. When
the public already possesses something, it is idle to talk of a contribution.
Therefore the basis of the patent law may be summarized in this
fashion: The aim of the patent law is the promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts by permanently increasing the store of received
public knowledge; the means to this end is the grant of the limited monopoly
to inventors on their novel contributions; and the justification of this monop-
oly is found in the principle of novelty which limits the subject matter of
the monopoly to what was not previously enjoyed by the public. This rela-
tionship of patentee and public is peculiar and their conflicting interests are
best resolved according to the principle of novelty. To draw analogies to
the grant, the reward or the contract only obscures the reality of the interests
involved. The grant of the limited monopoly should not be construed
against or in favor of either interest. An unbiased approach to the deter-
mination of the extent of novelty in each case is the best rule: "Has the
patentee added anything of value to the sum of human knowledge, has he
made the world's work easier, cheaper and safer, would the return to the
prior art be a retrogression?" 18
INTERESTS IN INVENTIONS BEFORE PATENTING, AND SECRET PROCESSES
The only legal protection given to unpatented inventions is indirectly
by way of equitable relief against a breach of trust. It is the breach of
trust at which the law strikes primarily; the invention is protected only inci-
16. The disclaimer statute allows a patentee formally to disclaim subject matter im-
properly covered by too broad a claim, thus in effect narrowing an otherwise invalid claim.
See Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co., Inc., 282 U. S. 445 (1931), in which the Court set forth
the history of and the reasons for the disclaimer statutes. See also Carbice Corp. v. Ameri-
can Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27, 3In. (i931) ; FEDmRco, STATUTORY DIscIAIm-
ERS IN PATENT LAW (1935).
17. See Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co., Inc., 282 U. S. 445, 452 (1931). Cf. Altoona
Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S. 477 (1935).
I8. O'Rourke Engineering Const. Co. v. M'Mullan, 16o Fed. 933, 938 (C. C. A. 2d, 1go8).
The monopoly must bear a reasonable relation to the extent of the invention contributed to
the public. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Wolff, 8o F. (2d) 314, 315 (C. C. A. Ist, 1935). "A patent
is a governmental grant of monopoly for the making, selling, and use of a novelty (disclosed
therein) as claimed by the patent. Nothing which is not novel (in a patentable sense) as
disclosed in the patent is subject to such monopoly even though covered by the paper grant,
and nothing having such novelty is so subject unless properly disclosed and properly claimed
in the patent." American Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F. (2d) m16, i17
(1935). See infra note 62, for an excellent statement of the function of the principle of
novelty as a just delineation of the interests of the inventor and the public.
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dentally and to a limited extent. 19 The patent law abhors a secret and
begrudges its equitable protection to the trade secret disclosed in a confi-
dential relationship. Where parties have been drawn into a confidential
relationship by contract, express or implied, contemplating the preservation
of secrecy in regard to knowledge revealed through the special confidence
so accepted, equity will enjoin the breach of this faith. The recipient of this
confidence will be restrained from abusing the trust reposed in him by
reaping the benefit of the confidential knowledge himself or by disclosing it
to others.20  This protection extends to strangers to the confidential rela-
tionship who obtain the knowledge by inducing, or participating knowingly
in, a breach of trust.2 ' Thus the difference between rights in a patented
invention and rights in an unpatented invention is that the former operate
against all the world, but the latter operate against only those who obtained
the invention through a breach of trust. The former are rights in rem, the
latter rights in personam only.
22
When an unpatented invention is kept as a trade-secret, a confidential
relationship between employer and employee arises by implication in the
absence of an express contract of secrecy.2 3 Even though an invention is
not patentable, it may nevertheless be a trade-secret and the basis of a confi-
dential relationship. 24 Public policy against restraint of trade, however,
prohibits a trade-secret in common knowledge which workmen freely possess
in the art and need for gaining a livelihood when they leave one employer
for another.25  Absolute secrecy is not necessary but there must be a quali-
fied secrecy to support a confidential relationship such as is implied between
employer and employee. 26  If a confidential relationship is definitely estab-
1g. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917) (leading case
on protection of trade secrets) ; Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., I98 U. S. 236,
250-251 (i9o5) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 2o20 U. S. 373, 402-403 (1911) ;
Hoeltke v. Kemp Mfg. Co., 8o F. (2d) 912, 923 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) (a secret disclosed in
confidence is protected "upon the principle that equity will not permit one to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another") ; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 2IO
Pa. 464, 6o Atl. 4 (1904).
20. See supra note I9.
21. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 Fed. 401 (W. D. Mich. i9o8) (any mem-
ber of the public who discovers the trade secret or invention without breaching any confiden-
tial. relation is entirely free to use it as he pleases).
22. Feasal v. Noxall Polish Mfg. Co., 268 Fed. 887, 892 (E. D. Pa. 192o) ; Tower Mfg.
Co. v. Monsanto Chemical Works, 2o F. (2d) 386, 387 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) ("The owner of
a secret process has no right, except against those who have contracted expressly, or by im-
plication, not to disclose the secret, or who have obtained it by unfair means.") ; Allen-
Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F. (2d) 293 (N. D. Ill. 1929). But the voluntary
divulging of a good suggestion, even though adopted, is not a sufficient reason for implying
a confidential relationship where there is no actual contract, express or implied. Moore v.
Ford Motor Co., 28 F. (2d) 529 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) ; Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70
F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
23. Wiggins Sons' Co. v. Cott-A-Lap Co., I69 Fed. i5o (D. Conn. i9og).
24. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
25. Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Williamson Co., 269 Fed. 614 (C. C. A. 6th, i2o).
26. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 387, 62 Atl. 339 (1907);
75 N. J. Eq. 542, 72 Ati. 97o (19o9). But "'No Admittance' signs on a manufacturing plant
are not evidence that the methods used are secret, and that employees are legally precluded
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lished, as by contract, the secrecy becomes relatively unimportant, provided
no question of restraint of trade arises. In some cases secrecy has been
presumed where a violation of confidence is shown; in others, secrecy from
rivals in competition is sufficient to obtain protection against inequitable
competition arising out of a breach of confidence.
2 7
Though the trade-secret and unpatented invention are frequently spoken
of as property, the truth is that the characteristics of property flow inciden-
tally from the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require-
ment of good faith. Through this incidental protection, the trade-secret and
unpatented invention can be in a sense transferred, held in trust and dealt
with as a res.2" In strict theory the trade-secret and unpatented invention
are not property, though they may be the basis of a patent which is prop-
erty.2 9 In spite of this indirect protection any extended use of an invention
as a trade-secret is condemned by a loss of patent rights.30
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Defined by Statute
The basic patent statute provides that "any person who has invented
or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter or any new and useful improvements thereof" may obtain a patent
therefor unless the invention has been abandoned.3 ' The remainder of this
section of the statute is directed to a definition of what shall constitute the
limits of public knowledge for the determination of novelty and what shall
amount to constructive abandonment. The word "discovered" has in effect
been deleted by a long settled construction giving it the same meaning as
"invented".
The statute strictly limits the field of public knowledge at the date of
the invention to what has been in public use, including on sale, in this coun-
from using the same." Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Lange, 2o F. (2d) 8oi (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ;
Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Co., 2o F. (2d) 387 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) (secrecy will be pre-
sumed where a violation of confidence is shown).
27. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 387, 62 Atl. 339 (1907);
75 N. J. Eq. 542, 72 Ati. 97o (i9og).
28. Notes (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 1419; (1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1162-1163.
29. Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U. S. 6o5, 611-612 (1888) ; M. J. Lewis Prod-
ucts Co. v. Lewis, 57 F. (2d) 886 (E. D. Pa. 1931); Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling Motor
Truck Co., 50 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
30. Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U. S. 50 (1923) ; Macbeth-Evans v. General Elec-
tric Co., 246 Fed. 695 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; Vanore v. Improta, 25 F. (2d) 918, 923 (App.
D. C. 1928).
31. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. A. § 31 (1929), amended by 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35
U. S. C. A. § 31 (Supp. 1936). Designs and plants which are included in the statute are more
conveniently treated separately from the "utility" patent, and for that reason are not included
here. The same fundamental principles apply to all types of patentable subject matter with
differences in detail. Novelty is the justification of all types of patentable subject matter
whether usefil or ornamental. Cf. the Italian Patent Statute, September 13, 1934, No. i6o2,
Articles 14 and 17, showing a simple statement of patentable invention in terms of novelty
and utility followed by a definition of novelty; also the German statute law, STINGHAM,
PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHSMUSTER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW )1935), 151, 197-199.
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try, or patented or described in a printed publication in any country.3 The
novelty of the invention is judged and considered with reference to this
limited field of prior art, all other forms of knowledge being excluded as
vague and transitory. There is a measure of permanency in knowledge
appearing in the form of a public use or a printed publication.
The statute is equally definite on what shall amount to constructive
abandonment of all patent rights. It provides that when an invention has
become part of the prior art by public use in this country, or patenting or'
publication in any country, abandonment will be conclusively presumed
unless a patent application is filed within two years. This is a statutory
basis for the general principle that after an invention has been in the pos-
session of the public for two years, monopolistic restrictions should not be
allowed except in special situations.33 Where an invention has been given
to the public by actual abandonment there remains no justification for the
monopoly thereafter because of a lack of novelty.
Briefly, a patentable invention is definable as one which is new and
useful, and has not been abandoned, actually or constructively. Novelty,
the most fundamental of these qualities, is determined by a comparison with
the field of public knowledge as it existed when the invention was made.34
The public knowledge is strictly limited to what has been publicly used in
this country, or described in a printed publication or patent in any country.3 5
All patent rights to an invention may be lost through abandonment oil
through constructive abandonment, the latter being conclusively presumed
from a delay in filing a patent application for two years after the invention
became prior art. Utility, the other fundamental quality of a patentable
invention, must flow directly from the novel features by causal relation.
The utility is the advantage or benefit of the change over the prior art. The
effect of a prior foreign or domestic patent to the inventor in terminating
the patentability of his invention is a collateral limitation.
Patentable Subject Matter
The subject matter of a patentable invention is limited by the statute
to an "art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter." Thus it
may be stated generally that arts and instrumentalities include all patentable
subject matter. The term "art" or method is, however, subject to three
limitations. First, a pure idea residing only in the mind and having no
32. Secret knowledge and use are not part of prior art because not in a form accessible to
the public, nor is an abandoned patent application a part of the prior art. United Chromium
v. General Motors Corp., ix F. Supp. 694 (N. D. Mich. 1935).
33. Hendrickson v. Ronning, 76 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
34. This strict and definite use of the term "novelty" is in contrast with the present vague
and loose use of the term by digest writers.
35. See United States Hoffman Machinery Corp. v. Pantex Pressing Machine, 35 F. (2d)
523, 524 (D. Del. 1929), in which it is said that things may be "known to the art through
patents, publications or use." See RoBizsoN, PATENTs (1890) 423-425.
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operation outside the mind in intimate relation to physical substance is not
patentable subject matter.3 6 Second, a principle of operation having no
existence except as part of an instrumentality is not patentable as an art.
37
Third, a law of nature is not patentable subject matter.38
That pure ideas or abstract mental processes are not patentable subject
matter is in accord with the spirit of the thoroughly practical patent law.
The statutory classification, considered in its totality, limits "art" by inter-
pretation to the industrial methods of the artisan according to the general
character of the other three classes. A patentable art must be intimately-
associated with a physical instrumentality through the manner of the use or
manufacture of the instrumentality. This interpretation is further strength-
ened by the rigid rule of reduction to practice which holds that an invention
is not completed until it has been successfully embodied in practical form,
and fugitive ideas remaining in the realm of pure thought have no legal
standing as inventions. Arts or methods which are actually practiced with
intimate relation to an instrumentality find a physical basis in that way and
are rescued from the realm of pure thought. Printing or writing without
structure is not patentable subject matter.3 9 Therefore, patentable subject
matter must be either a physical instrumentality or an art or method inti-
mately related to the operation or manufacture of a physical instrumen-
tality.
40
On the other hand, a method which is so bound up with the operation
of an instrumentality that the method cannot exist other than as part of the
instrumentality is not patentable separately as an art.41 A principle of oper-
ation links the instrumentality to its purpose after the principle of cause and
effect. This causal relation describes the way in which the instrumentality
is used to accomplish its purpose. If the method of operation is performable
by hand, for example, it has separate existence of its own and is patentable
as an art.
42
36. The Canadian Patent Act of 1923, c. 23, § 7 (2), which closely follows the United
States Statutes, expressly provides that no patent shall issue for any mere scientific principle
or abstract theory. i WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) §§ i8, 20; ROBINSON, PATENTS
(i890) § I66. The question -of the patentability of a business method or system was pur-
posely avoided in In re Wait, 453 O~iciAL GAzErm PAT. OFF. 73o (App. D. C. I92o).
37. I WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. I929) § 25; In re McCurdy, 76 F. (2d) 4oo (C. C.
P. A. i935).
38. i WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) § 18; General Elec. Co. v. DeForest Radio
Co., 28 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
39. In re Sterling, 70 F. (2d) 9IO (C. C. P. A. 1934) ; In re McKee, 75 F. (2d) 99i
(C. C. P. A. 1935) ; In re Scott, 76 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
40. "A patentable process is a method of treatment of certain materials to produce a
particular result or product." Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U. S. 245, 255
(927) ; ROBINSON, PATENTS (1890) 229.
41. Smith Engineering Works v. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 68 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934) ; Interstate Folding Box Corp. v. Empire Box Corp., 68 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934).
42. WAITE, PATENT LAW (1920) 22-24; I WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) 25; ROBIN-
SON, PATENTS (1890) § 159; In re McCurdy, 76 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
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A law of nature is not patentable as an art because it has in a sense a
previous existence awaiting discovery by man. As natural laws they are not
originated by man; they cannot be invented in the sense of the statute; and
they are never patentable subject matter of themselves. Means utilizing
these laws of nature may, however, be patentable subject matter. In cases
of this type the novelty must be found in what was created to make use of
the discovered law. The means need not be patentable over the law thus
utilized because laws of nature are not part of the prior art. There must be
something more than a law of nature to constitute patentable subject matter.
This idea is frequently expressed in the cases holding that a claim for a law
of nature is too broad and must be limited to some particular means employ-
ing that law of nature.
INVENTION
Originality, the Essence of Invention
The term "invention" is used very loosely and without consistency in its
meaning. Frequently invention is used in the sense of creation and again
in the sense of simple origination. Invention is at times confused with
novelty as if novelty were an element of invention. Invention is also used
to imply patentable invention. This vagueness obscures to some extent the
path of reason and the significance of the conclusions reached.
The theory which regards invention as creation requires a psychological
investigation of the inventor's mind to determine whether the invention
evolved from the intuitive faculties of the mind or proceeded from the rea-
soning faculties. For this investigation, the inventor is fictitiously presumed
to know all the prior art, and invention is judged accordingly. Much effort
has been expended by the courts in trying to work out a definition of inven-
tion in terms of the creative powers of the mind and the line has been drawn
between the intuitive faculties which mark creation and the inferior reasoning
faculties.43 Finally the Supreme Court of the United States candidly gave
up hope of defining invention in this sense and reluctantly turned to the
numerous rules of thumb which had grown up as aids in dealing with the
problem.
44
This theory is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it does not recog-
nize emphatically that the justification of the patent monopoly lies in novelty
and not in creation. The field of public knowledge is increased by a novel
contribution quite irrespective of how the invention was conceived; and
whether an invention proceeded from the intuitive faculties as a creation or
from the powers of reason is not material to the justification of the award
43. See Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., II3 U. S. 59, 72 (1884).
44. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 427 (i891) : "The truth is the word (invention)
cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a
particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not."
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of the monopoly. Second, this theory confuses invention and novelty by
bringing the prior art into the question of invention through the fictitious
presumption that the inventor knew all the prior art when he made his inven-
tion. Novelty as a separate statutory consideration is much better dealt with
on the standard of the average man in patent law, the skilled artisan.45
Instead of working on an undefinable and mystical standard of creation, it is
better to judge on the basis of the average man as is done in all other fields
of the law.
Consequently, it is preferable to regard originality as properly of the
essence of invention and novelty as a separate consideration.46 If the idea was
copied, or stolen, or derived from another, originality is lacking and the idea
is not an invention. This meaning is simple and avoids the hopeless search for
a practical definition of invention as creation. Stealing, copying and servile
imitation are properly discouraged and the inventor is given the reward, if
justifiable on the basis of novelty. There is no occasion for wasting time
to investigate the inventive or creative faculty when novelty is the crucial
consideration of each case.47 An investigation of the mental process of an
inventor must always lead into a hopeless labyrinth and at the same time it
improperly emphasizes the character of the inventor's mind when the atten-
tion should be focused on what new contribution was made if any. There-
fore, invention may be defined as origination in contradistinction to copying
or imitation, and an invention may be new or old depending on the prior art
at the date of the invention. A patentable invention is thus an invention that
is new and useful.
Reduction to Practice
Even though an idea be the product of original thinking in contradis-
tinction to copying, it does not amount to invention in the eyes of the patent
45. The skilled artisan is the familiar "average man" who stalks through all branches of
the law in different guises. Cf. HoLmEs, THE Commor LAw (i8Si) lo8.
46. The basis of this theory is clearly indicated in the following quotation: "Originality
is the basis of copyright protection and mere copying can in no way satisfy the constitutional
aims of the law. This requirement is also true in patent law. But in copyright law it is not
necessary that there be novelty which is an added requirement for patent protection." See
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) in which originality and
novelty are carefully distinguished.
47. "The merit is the same, whether the invention was the fruit of accident or design;
because the merit consists in having realized the idea and carried it out in practice." CURTIS,
PATENTS (3d ed. 1867) 27. "Still, we read in many of the adjudged cases frequent discussions
of the question, whether the inventive faculty has been at work in the production of a particu-
lar thing. And nothing is more common than to witness at the bar, in the trial of patent
causes, a great expenditure of evidence and argument upon the inquiry whether a particular
change from an old to a new article, process, method of operation or combination amounts to
an invention, within the meaning of the patent law. It may be doubted, whether all the dif-
ferent forms of stating or investigating the question of sufficiency of invention are anything
more than different modes of conducting the inquiry, whether the particular subject of a
patent possesses the statute requisites of novelty and litility, both of which qualities must be
found uniting in it." Id. at 23-24.
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law until it has been put into practical form. 48  The fugitive idea has no
standing without a physical basis. A reduction to practice tests the com-
pletion of the idea in practical form and carries with it the best demonstration
of the utility and worth of the invention.49  Publication is not an element of
reduction to practice; a reduction to practice may take place in secret. When
an invention is fully described and claimed in an application for a patent, it
is thereby represented in a physical form and in effect reduced to practice, if
found allowable by the Patent Office.50 Whether there must be an actual,
use depends on the character of the invention, but in the great majority of
cases a convincing use is necessary as the final test of operativeness and
completion.r' In certain exceptional cases where the successful operation is
at once apparent from the physical embodiment itself, an actual use is not
necessary.52 An abandoned experiment has no standing as an invention be-
cause without recognized success there is no completion in practical form.
An invention, therefore, is an original idea physically expressed in practical
form.
The Date of Invention and Priority between Rival Claimants
The date of invention is important for the determination of the field of
the prior art on which novelty is to be judged. 53 It is also important where
there are rival claimants to the same invention. Logically, the date of inven-
tion is the date of its reduction to practice or completion; and prima facie
the first to reduce to practice or file a patent application is the first inventor.
He who first completed the invention and made it available to the public in
practical form should be the first inventor because he first gave the knowledge
to the public.54 However, out of considerations of justice to the inventor,
it is recognized that the meritorious part of the inventive act is the concep-
tion; and hence the date of conception may be recognized as the date of inven-
tion, provided it is shown that there was no lack of diligence in reducing to
practice. By the requirement of diligence, the interests of the public in a
48. Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481, 489 (189o); Lowe v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 2 F. (2d) 157 (N. D. Cal. 1924). "Just as a patent affords pro-
tection only to the means of reducing an inventive idea to practice, so the copyright law pro-
tects the means of expressing an idea." Judge Hough in Dymow v. Bolton, ii F. (2d) 69p,
692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
49. See Corona Co. v. Dovan Corp., 276 U. S. 358, 383 (ig28).
5o. An abandoned application is not a constructive reduction to practice; it is only evi-
dence of conception. Euth v. Oliver, 7o F. (2d) io (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
51. Smith v. Nevin, 73 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
52. Payne v. Harley, 71 F. (2d) 2o8 (C. C. P. A. 1934).
53. Sandy MacGregor Co. v. Naco Grip Co., 2 F. (2d) 655, 657 (C. C. P. A. 1924).
The merit of an invention is judged as of time when made, Jordan Marsh Co. v. Wolff, 8o
F. (2d) 314 (C. C. P. A. 1936).
54. See in this connection the Canadian Patent Act, 1923, c. 23, § 37a (i), providing that
a prior inventor must disclose his invention or use it in such manner that it becomes available
to the public in order to establish priority. Compare in this connection the United States rule
that the date of invention is limited to presence or first introduction into the United States.
Rebuffat v. Crawford, 68 F. (2d) 98o (C. C. P. A. 1934).
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prompt completion are thus harmonized with a feeling of justice toward the
individual who first conceived the invention. 55
The recognition of the merit of the first to conceive the invention is
further evidenced by the relaxation of the rule of diligence in favor of the
first to conceive where there are rival claimants to the same invention. Here
the first to conceive is regarded as the first inventor regardless of diligence
if he was also the first to reduce to practice. There is considerable justice
in awarding the status of first inventorship to him who was first to conceive
and also first to reduce to practice; he was the first to do the more meritorious
part of the inventive act and also the first to satisfy the interests of the public
in a reduction to practical form.
To sum up, the date of invention is the earliest date of conception from
which diligence in reducing to practice can be shown.5 6  As an exception to
this rule in the case of rival claimants, the first to conceive will be regarded
as the first inventor if he was also the first to reduce to practice, diligent
or not.57
The status of first inventorship, however, may be lost by abandonment,
concealment or suppression, because such conduct is antagonistic to the spirit
of the patent laws to encourage the prompt disclosure of new ideas. The
doctrine of loss of rights by abandonment, concealment or suppression has
its root in the case of Mason v. Hepburn.58 Later cases following Mason v.
Hepburn have restricted the doctrine to those cases involving a stimulation
or spurring into activity of the first inventor by knowledge of the acts of a
rival inventor. Abandonment, concealment or suppression will not be in-
ferred from a mere failure to file a patent application promptly.5 9 Thus
55. The doctrine of diligence appears to have its origin in the Patent Statute of 1836.
5 STAT. 117. See Reed v. Cutter, Fed. Cas. No. 11,645, at 435 (D. Mass. 1841) ; Automatic
Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. Ist, 19o9);
Christie v. Seybold, 55 Fed. 69 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893).
Diligence need be shown only from a time just prior to the entrance of another into the
field to establish priority over that party. Grundy v. Van Leir, 75 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. P. A.
1935).
56. Under Rule 75 of the Rules of Practice of the Patent Office, an affidavit avoiding a
prior art reference on the ground that the date of the invention is prior to the filing date of
the reference, must show diligence to take advantage of the earlier conception date as the
date of the invention which determines the prior art.
57. On priority and the date of invention, see generally Laas v. Scott, 161 Fed. 122 (E.
D. Wis. 19o8); Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., I66 Fed. 288
(C. C. A. ISt, 19o9) ; UNDERWOOD, INTER IENCE PRACTICE (1928) § 68.
58. 13 App. D. C. 86 (1898) in which an inventor reduced his invention to practice in the
presence of a few witnesses and then for a long period did nothing further. After a later
inventor had already obtained his patent on the same invention, the first inventor filed a patent
application, and the patent was, in the interference proceeding, awarded to the second inventor
in fact because he was in law the first inventor.
59. Miller v. Hayman, 46 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. P. A. 1931) ; Severson v. Olson, 64 F. (2d)
694 (C. C. P. A. 1933); Knoop v. Woodward, 69 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. P. A. 1934); Brogden
v. Henry, 69 F. (2d) 978 (C. C. P. A. 1934) ; Osgood v. Ridderstrom, 71 F. (2d) 191 (C. C.
P. A. 1934) ; Altorfer v. Hoag, 74 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. P. A. 1934) ; Bayer v. Rice, 75 F. (2d)
38, 241 (App. D. C. 1934) ; Garand v. Pedersen, 76 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. P. A. 1935) ; Ron-
ning Machinery Co. v. Winsor, 76 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. P. A. 1935) (doctrine of "secretion or
forgetfulness") ; Stresau v. Ipsen, 77 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. P. A. 1935) (concealment distin-
guished from abandonment) ; O'Brien, Mason v. Hepburn, A Critical Review (1936) I8 J.
PAT. OFF. SoC. 257.
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there is a distinction between a first inventor in fact and a first inventor in
the sense of the patent law. Cases of the type of Mason v. Hepburn should
be distinguished from cases where there was a use amounting to a "public
use." 60 On principles similar to those of Mason v. Hepburn, a prolonged
secret use may work an abandonment of all patent rights to the inventor,
deprive the inventor of any recognition as such under the patent laws, and
invalidate any patent obtained by him for that invention. 61
NOVELTY
The Standard for Distinguishing Inventions From the Prior Art and From
Each Other
Novelty is the justification for the grant of the patent monopoly, for
when the subject matter of the grant is new the public is deprived of nothing
it previously enjoyed.62  Thus the question of novelty involves a considera-
tion of what the public possessed in the field of public knowledge at the date
of the invention. A novel invention is one not found in the field of public
knowledge, that is, it has differences distinguishing it from the old.
Consequently novelty becomes a matter of distinctions or differences
from the prior art; it involves determining which of the infinite variations
of subject matter in the prior art are within the possession of the public and
which are not. Clearly certain variations of old subject matter which are
within the grasp of the average skilled artisan are really in possession of the
public in a practical sense. An art progresses naturally from the routine
ingenuity of the average craftsman and the fruit of this normal growth of
the art is but a part of the prior art.6" The public is in potential possession
of all improvements within the grasp of the average skilled artisan. The
prior art includes the implications of existing knowledge according to the
6o. Cf. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U. S. 358 (1928);
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wadsworth Electric Mfg. Co., 51 F. (2d) 447 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1931); McCollister, Experimental Use as Effecting the Validity of a Patent (1934)
16 J. PA . OFF. Soc. 387.
61. Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U. S. 50 (1923) ; Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v.
General Elec. Co., 246 F. 695 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; Vanore v. Improta, 25 F. (2) 918, 923
(App. D. C. 1928)
62. "En effet, la loi sur la propri~t6 industrielle, tout en accordant une protection efficace
a l'invention, defend avec une igale sollicitude les int6r&ts du domaine public contre les em-
pi~tements de ceux qui sous le titre d'inventeurs, chercheraient a dipouiller l'industrie des
ressources dont elle s'est enrichie antdrieurement. Aussi la premiere condition impos6e par la
loi, c'est la nouveaut6 de l'objet brevet6. Cette exigence est telle que si l'objet d~crit dans le
brevet n'est pas nouveau, le brevet ne peut 6tre valid6 par lanouveauti des d6tails con-
sign~s dans le certificat d'addition." BLANc, TRArk DE LA CoNTREAcox (4th ed. 1855) 464.
63. "Those decisions which emphasize the implications of existing knowledge . . . are
speaking of smaller gains within the compass of the routineer chemist, electrician or artisan;
that is not a severe test. But while the law grants its monopoly only to those whose originality
is out of the common (new), it does not demand genius." Judge Learned Hand in United
Chromifim v. International Silver Co., 6o F. (2d) 913, 916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). See Em-
bankment Patent Co. v. Miller, 8 F. Supp. 283, 285 (E. D. La. 1934) (the grant of a monop-
oly on a slight advance is unjust in principle).
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standard of the average artisan and those variations within the grasp of the
average artisan are not novel.
64
The principles of the patent law are thus brought down to the average
man of the art as a standard. 65  The time is ripe in patent law for a more
complete recognition of standards to operate harmoniously with those rules
that have proved of value. Rigid rules which cannot take into account all
circumstances of a situation have limitations and it is necessary to supplement
these rules with principles and standards which do have regard for all sur-
rounding circumstances. The standard of the average artisan is sound and
understandable, and it provides the flexibility that the rigid rules lack.
The following quotation from Judge Learned Hand is pertinent here:
"In patents, as in other branches of the law, the question is of the interests
involved; (patentable) inventions depend upon whether more was required
to fill the need than routine ingenuity of the ordinary craftsman. Such a
standard is no more a will-o'-the-wisp than others which the law adopts,
reasonable care, reasonable notice, and the like; the effort is to fix the standard
by recourse to average propensities, dispositions and capacities. Any attempt
to define it in general terms has always proved illusory; it is best to aban-
don it." 66
To sum up, novelty is that attribute which an idea possesses when it was
not before known to the prior art, nor was an obvious or natural development
therefrom according to the standard of the average artisan skilled in that
art.67 Developments obvious to the average artisan are part of the prior art
as a natural accretion and hence are potentially in possession of the public.
Inventions are distinguished from each other in the same way as inven-
tions are distinguished from the prior art in determining novelty. The obvious
variations of an invention which are within the grasp of the average artisan
are part of that invention just as similar variations of the prior art are part
of the prior art.68 Each invention includes all obvious variations and devel-
opments therefrom according to the standard of the average artisan; and
consequently, inventions are identical unless so different that one would not
be an obvious development from the other by the average artisan. Inven-
tions which are so different that more than the routine ingenuity of the
64. See Ingersoll v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 73 F. (2d) 323, 325 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934);
Hanson v. Slick, 230 Fed. 627, 632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916) (the high mechanical skill of modem
times has raised the standard of novelty).
65. See Atlantic Works v. Brady, io7 U. S. 192, i99-2o2 (1882).
66. Sachs v. Hartford Electric Supply Co., 47 F. (2d) 743, 748 (C. C. A. 2d, i931).
67. This statement is similar to Article 2 of the German Statute. See STRINGHAM, op.
cit. supra note 31, 144.
68. The principle that each invention includes all obvious variations thereof according to
the standard of the average artisan is the basis of the rather technical doctrine of equivalents
which extends patent protection to a range of equivalent elements specified in the claims of a
patent. The frequently encountered statement that infringement is not avoided by a change
in detail has the same basis as the doctrine of equivalents. See H. Ward Leonard v. Max-
well Motor Sales Corp., 252 Fed. 584, 589 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
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average artisan is necessary to develop one from the other are diverse. In-
ventions are thus either identical or diverse according to the standard of the
average artisan and this is of particular importance in cases of interference
and of double-patenting.
The Application of the Standard of Novelty
The determination of novelty is primarily a matter of the application
of the standard of the average skilled artisan; 69 this requires a consideration
of all the circumstances of each particular situation. Any factor which
throws light on the question whether an invention was within the grasp of
the average artisan is pertinent to novelty. This standard thus relieves the
rigidity of the narrow rules which are the skeleton of a legal system and
must be rigid in their very nature.
There is, however, a regrettable tendency to obscure the operation of
this simple standard by a number of rules of thumb which cannot have a
universal application from their very nature. These so-called rules are
usually of a negative character and are no more than empirical summations
of the holdings of a number of similar cases; they have no force in them-
selves as true rules of law.70 As an aid in the application of the standard of
the average artisan, they summarize factors which may be pertinent to the
question of novelty. When these guides are blindly given a supremacy as
rules of law and the superior standard lost sight of or subordinated to them,
error and confusion is the result.71 Like Gresham's law in regard to the
circulation of money, the spurious rule made as a hasty generalization with
a superficial appearance of truth tends to drive the superior but more subtle
principle and standard out of circulation in the legal world. These general-
izations of what factors may throw light on the question of novelty must not
be allowed to interfere with the full operation of the standard of the average
artisan, their only excuse for existence.
There are many of these factors which bear more or less on the question
of novelty. If many people have independently contrived the improvement
in question,72 or if any average artisan when shown the prior art and given
the problem produces the improvement, 73 this is evidence of the lack of
novelty. But if a particular need has been long recognized and unsuccessful
efforts made towards a solution of the problem, it can hardly be said in the
69. See mtpra note 45; Eibel Co. v. Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45, 63 (1923).
70. See Greene, Are there Dependable Rules of Causation? (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV.
6oi. Negligence and patentable novelty are both matters of the foresight of the average man
and the problems are basically similar. The inadequacy of absolute rules of legal causation
suggests a similar inadequacy of absolute rules of legal novelty. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Glidden Co., 67 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; Remington Rand Bus. Service v. Acme
Card System Co., 71 F. (2d) 628, 632 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
71. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co., 67 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933);
B. G. Corporation v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F. (2d) 2o, 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 935).
72. Bromley Bros. Carpet Co. v. Stewart, 51 Fed. 912, 915 (E. D. Pa. 1892).
73. National Co. v. Belcher, 68 Fed. 665, 668 (E. D. Pa. 1895).
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absence of other circumstances to have been within the grasp of the artisan
no matter how simple the improvement. 74 Immediate acceptance by the pub-
lic and great commercial success may evidence the widely felt need which
awaited something more than the efforts of the average artisan, provided of
course that the need was not afterwards created by the commercializing of
the improvement. Even the attitude of the public generally toward an inven-
tion, or the way in which the art and competitors received and regarded the
invention may be pertinent.7 5 Thus novelty in terms of the skilled artisan
"is always a function of the particular situation, of the conditions which
preceded and followed the appearance of the composition or the machine"
and this is a better standard "than easy absolutes which fit the immediate
occasion but lie athwart any realistic treatment of the next case." 76 This is
the historical method advocated by Judge Learned Hand; it looks to the
history of the art and to all the surrounding pircumstances for a determina-
tion by the standard of the average artisan of the question whether a novel
contribution has been made to the public knowledge or not.
Many of these generalizations which are in the form of simple rules
are concerned with the specific character of the improvement made. For
example, excellence of workmanship is generally no basis for novelty because
it is usually found in the field of artisanship. Likewise, duplication, changes
of degree, proportion, size or material, omission of elements, substitution of
equivalents, mere juxtaposition of elements, and analogous use are matters
usually within the sphere of activity of the average skilled artisan.77  But
these rules are not true legal rules; if in a particular case any of the types
of improvements mentioned above is beyond the skill of the average artisan,
novelty is present regardless of the rule. This is illustrated in the case of
the Edison incandescent light which involved a mere change in the diameter
of the light filament. This simple change of size was held to be a patentable
invention, that is novel and useful.
78
74. Cases collected in I WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) 74.
75. Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., 66 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933);
Stevens v. Carl Schmid, Inc., 73 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
76. Judge Learned Hand in DuPont de Nemours v. Glidden Co., 67 F. (2d) 392 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1933).
See reference to "historical test" in Lakeshire Cheese Co. v. Shefford Cheese Co., 72 F.
(2d) 497, 499 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 77 F. (2d) 274, 276
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; B. G. Corporation v. Walter Kidde Co., 79 F. (2d) 20, 22 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935).
77. Cases collected in I WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) 65.
78. Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co., 52 Fed. 300 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1892). To be patentable, a change in proportion or degree must be "critical", produc-
ing a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree. In re Dreyfus, 73 F. (2d) 931,
934 (C. C. P. A. 1934). See Remington Rand Bus. Service v. Acme Card System Co., 71
F. (2d) 628, 632 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) in which the court said: "There is, however, no rule
of law that the substitution of a new material for an old is not patentable. The question is
always whether the alteration requires invention or merely the exercise of mechanical skill
and judgment." See Judge Learned Hand in B. G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F. (2d)
20, 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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The determination of the patentability of combinations of old or partly
old elements such as the combination of an eraser and a lead pencil has been
something of a problem, judging from the confusion in the cases. 79 The
realities of the problem itself have been obscured by the growth of a puz-
zling doctrine of "aggregation", as is frequently the case with difficult
knots in the law. Apparently, an aggregation is a combination which is
obvious to the average artisan, or perhaps, it is a combination which consists
merely of juxtaposed old elements and hence is not usually novel.8 0 Judge
Learned Hand has pronounced the doctrine both useless and incompre-
hensible. He tells us that "aggregation" is a catchword without definite
meaning.81
Actually the problem is best dealt with on the standard of novelty based
on the average artisan like any other case. If the combination by which
the advantages of the invention are secured is not within the grasp of the
average artisan, novelty is present and the combination is patentable.
8 2  If
novelty is lacking there is no need to coin a new legal term such as "aggre-
gation" to damn it. Doubtless an aid in the application of the standard
of novelty is found in the empirical rule summarizing the cases of this
type to the effect that mere aggregation or juxtaposing of old elements is
usually obvious to the average artisan.
3
Possibly the doctrine of aggregation is the expression of a faint hope
that the way in which the elements are related in a combination may solve
mechanically the question of novelty, but even absence of mechanical inter-
action is no test of aggregation.8 4 At any rate it contributes little to the
solution of the problem of determining a patentable invention, and it is best
to abandon it for the simple standard of the average artisan.8 5
79. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347 (1875) ; see also Grinnel Washing Machine Co.
v. Johnson Co., 247 U. S. 426 (97) in which the combination in question was of a washing
machine and wringer.
8o. A frequent quotation from a classic case on this point is: "Merely bringing old de-
vices into juxtaposition and there allowing each to work out its own effect without produc-
ing something novel is not (patentable) invention." Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U. S. 353,
357 (873). In an inspired effort to give this doctrine life, an analogy has been drawn to a
football team and a track team, the former being like a patentable combination and the latter
like an aggregation. Skinner Bros. Belting Co. v. Oil Well Improvements Co., 54 F. (2d)
896, 898 (C. C. A. 8th, ig3i).
81. Sachs v. Hartford Electric Supply Co., 47 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 2d, 1!931); Simplex
Piston Ring Co. v. Horton-Gallo-Creamer Co., 61 F. (2d) 748 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Setlow, 66 F. (2d) 585, 587 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
82. "If the result flows from such combination which is new and useful, and which is not
inherent in each of the features assembled, and which is beyond the skill of the mechanic, the
issuance of a patent for such a combination may be justified." In re Gehres, 73 F. (2d) 505,
o6 (C. C. P. A. 1934) ; In re Cordes, 76 F. (2d) 302, 304 (C. C. P. A. I935)--"the com-
bination is obvious to persons skilled in the art and, therefore, not new or novel in the patent-
able sense"; In re Hodler, 73 F. (2Ad) 507 (C. C. P. A. 1934) ("a vital union" is necessary).
83. This is all that is implicit in the case of Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U. S. 353, 357
(873).
84. Sachs v. Hartford Electric Supply Co., 47 F. (2d) 743 (0931). -
85. Ibid.
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The Substance and Limits of the Prior Art
Prior art is the field of public knowledge on which the novelty of an
invention is judged. It is a stable and definite body of knowledge which is
actually in the possession of the public and from which the more casual type
of knowledge is excluded as too vague and fugitive to gain a foothold in the
art.86 Until casual knowledge becomes an established fact by appearing
in a public use or in a published record, it is not actually in possession of
the public. Therefore the prior art is strictly limited to knowledge which
has either gone into public use in this country or been recorded anywhere
in a printed publication or patent.8 7  Public uses outside this country are so
unlikely to come to the attention of the art that they are excluded from the
prior art as casual knowledge. Nor does the prior art include a "lost art",
which is knowledge that was once prior art but has since been forgotten
and is no longer recorded in a printed publication or patent.
8
A public use must be something more than a mere casual or experi-
mental use; 89 it must be a use "so far understood and practiced or persisted
in as to become an established fact, accessible to the public and contributing
definitely to the sum of human knowledge." 1o Nothing short of a reduc-
tion to practice will do.91 A public use is determined by its relation to
the public knowledge, a relationship which permeates and dominates the
growth of patent law; and questions of public use are decided by "consider-
ing whether in fact the use was such as to impart knowledge to the trade
at large." 92 All circumstances are to be taken into consideration. There
can be no question of public use until the stage of experimentation is past
and a reduction to practice accomplished. 93  A simple placing "on sale"
has the effect of a public use under the statute; the statutory words "on
sale" are properly interpreted as a species of public use which is commercial
in character and peculiarly well adapted to inform the art.
86. Just as "a conception of the mind is not an invention until represented in some phys-
ical form" [Symington Co. v. National Casting Co., 25o U. S. 383, 386 (i919)], also a
conception of the mind is not prior art until represented in some physical form. "It is not
public knowledge of his invention that precludes the inventor from obtaining a patent for it,
but a public use or sale of it." Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126, 136 (1877).
87. RoBINsoN, PATENTS (1890) 423 et seq.
88. WAITE, PATENmT LAW (192o) 92-96.
89. American Stainless Steel Co. v. Rustless Iron Corp., 71 F. (2d) 404, 407 (C. C. A.
4th, 1934).
go. Gaylor v. Wilder, io How. 477, 497 (U. S. I85o) ; Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292
Fed. 480, 485 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); Anthracite Separator Co v. Pollock, 175 Fed. toS, iii
(W. D. Pa. igog); Robinson v. Fruit Machinery Co., 216 Fed. 179 (D. N. J. 1914);
Diamond Patent Co. v. Car Co., 217 Fed. 4oo, 4o2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
91. Block v. Nathan Anklet Support Co., 9 F. (2d) 311, 313 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
92. See Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. H. Griffin & Sons Co., 29 F. (2d) 646,648, 649 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928); RoBixsoN, PATENTS (I89o) § 324, to the effect that the real test of a prior use is
the degree of knowledge it confers on the public.
93. Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. H. Griffin & Sons Co., 29 F. (2d) 646, 649 (C. C. A. 2d,
1928).
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A use which is experimental in character does not amount to a reduction
to practice and until success terminates the stage of experimentation, there
can be no public use. 94 An experimental use is a use conducted in good
faith for the main purpose of testing the qualities of an invention and for
no other purposes not naturally incidental to that.9 5  An incidental profit or
sale is not necessarily inconsistent with experimentation.9 The character
of a use depends upon a full consideration of all surrounding circumstances. 97
A "printed publication is anything which is printed and without any
injunction of secrecy, made accessible to any part of the public. . . While
it is true that the phrase 'printed publication', presupposes enough currency
to make the work part of the possessions of the art, it demands no more." 98
A single copy in a library gives sufficient currency to put the public into
possession; and a freely circulated catalog, however ephemeral its existence,
is even more fitted to inform the art because the catalog goes directly to
those whose interests make them more likely to observe and remember what-
ever may be new and useful.99 A typewritten publication is probably not a
"printed publication" because it is less permanent in character and is limited
to a few copies.100 On the other hand, a "printed publication" is not limited
to words but includes drawings and figures. The question of what consti-
tutes a printed publication depends upon what the art necessarily gathered
from what appeared; currency and a form understandable to the average
artisan are necessary to impart knowledge to the art.
94. Utilities Service v. Walker, 78 F. (2d) I8 (C. C. P. A. 1935). Where a use demon-
strates that the invention is complete and is capable of producing the result sought to be
accomplished the experimental stage ends. Hall v. Macneale, io7 U. S. go (1882). Improve-
ments may still be desirable. Smith and Griggs Co. v. Sprague, 123 U. S. 249 (887).
95. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126 (1877); 1 WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929)
§ 139.
96. 1 WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) § 139. But a public use by one other than the
inventor does not raise any question of a public use unless the use was subject to restrictions
and under the control of the inventor for the main purpose of experimentation. Root v.
Third Ave. R. R., 146 U. S. 210 (1892) ; Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126, 134 (1877) ;
Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U. S. 333, 336 (1881) ; Swain v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 1o2 Fed. gio
(D. Mass. 19oo). The main purpose of the transaction involving the alleged use is a prime
consideration. Denivelle v. MacGruer & Simpson, 4 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
97. The subject matter of the invention is a consideration. Austin Machinery Co. v.
Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
The good faith of the user is important. Wilkie v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., L4 F.
(2d) 8ix (C. C. A. 3d, r926) ; Cooper v. Robertson, 38 F. (2d) 852 (D. Md. 193o).
The length qf period reasonably necessary to determine the completeness of the particu-
lar invention is a consideration. Austin Machinery Co. v. Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13
F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
Historically experimental use grew out of abandonment as an exception in favor of the
inventor, on the theory that the mental element of abandonment was lacking, and the excep-
tion was carried into constructive abandonment.
98. Jockmus v. Leviton (judge Learned Hand), 28 F. (2d) 812, 813 (C. C. A. 2d,
1928) ; Imperial Glass Co. v. A. H. Heisey & Co., 294 Fed. 267 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923). "Some-
thing more than printing is required. The statute goes upon the theory that the work has
been made accessible to the public, and that the invention has been thereby given to the public
and is no longer patentable to anyone." Collier v. Simpson, 2o Fed. 906, 91o (D. Ore. 1884).
99. Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F. (2d) 812, 813 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
IOO. See Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U. S. 358, 372-373 (1928).
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A patent is a form of publication; 101 the public is in possession of
all that is clearly described according to the standard of the average artisan.
A foreign patent is effective as a publication from its issuing date; 102 a
United States patent, from its filing date.1 08  The distinction is explainable
on the ground that foreign patents are not in the possession of the public
of the United States until sealed and issued, but the filing of an application
for a United States patent is a contribution to the public by the filing.
UTILITY
A patentable invention must be new and useful. The utility must flow
from the novel feature of the subject matter of the invention in the form
of some advantage or benefit; the utility or advantage must be caused by
the novel feature. In this way the utility and novelty unite together
in the same invention. If the advantages or benefits are mischievous or
prejudicial to the public welfare, there is no utility in a legal sense.104 If the
invention is inoperative, it cannot be said to be useful because its purpose is
not satisfied and no benefits or advantages flow from the novelty.10 5 The
degree or amount of utility is not important; presence of any utility what-
soever is sufficient to sustain a patent.' 0 6 The degree of the invention de-
pends upon how novel the change from the prior art was, irrespective of
whether the benefit was great or small. Commercial success is evidence




The final requisite of a patentable invention is that it has not been
abandoned.'00  Abandonment may be actual or constructive. Actual aban-
donment occurs whenever there is an unequivocal relinquishment of all
expectation of securing a patent therefor, and an accompanying formation
of an expectation that the invention will always be free to the public.110
ioi. Milburn Co. v. Davis Co., 270 U. S. 390 (1926) ; Hazeltine Corp. v. R. E. B. Service
Corp., 8 F. Supp. ioo, 105 (E. D. N. Y. 1934).
lO2. Schrader's Son, Inc. v. Wein Sales Corp., 3 F. (2d) 999, IOOI (E. D. N. Y. 1924);
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Royal-Eastern Electrical Supply Co., 9 F. (2d) 397, 403
(E. D. N. Y. 1925).
1O3. Alex. Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 27o U. S. 39o (1926); Hazeltine
Corp. v. R. E. B. Service Corp., 8 F. Supp. ioo, 105 (E. D. N. Y. 1934). See In re Youker,
77 F. (2d) 624 (C. C. P. A. 1935) (the court treated a patent as prior art as of its filing date
but observed that it was not technically prior art at that time).
104. I WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) § 117; WA1TE, PATENTS (1920) 107-117.
105. Coupe v. Roger, 155 U. S. 565, 574 (1894) ; Schmidt v. Central Foundry Co., 229
Fed. 157, 159 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
io6. Gibbs v. Hoefner, 19 Fed. 323 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1884) ; Western Willite Co. v.
Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 16 F. (2d) 446, 450 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
io7. Tomkins-Hawley-Fuller Co. v. Holden, 273 Fed. 424, 43o (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
io8. Cases collected in I WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) § 125.
109. 29 STAT. 692 (I897), 35 U. S. C. A. § 31 (1929) ; Hendrickson & Nelson v. Ron-
ning & Ronning, 76 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. P. A. 1935) (the doctrine of constructive abandon-
ment is now based on the above statute).
110. 1 WALKER, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) § 132.
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For example, a patentee abandons on the issue of his patent all unclaimed
subject matter, unless abandonment is negatived by other then pending
applications on the same invention.-1  All rights are preserved through
other copending applications until a hiatus in prosecution occurs. Construc-
tive abandonment is a conclusive presumption arising from an appreciable
period of possession of an invention by the public, regardless of the intent
of the inventor. For example, the statutory bars to applications for a patent
fix this period of public possession as part of the prior art at two years.
112
Abandonment is a bar to the grant of a patent because the invention is then
irrevocably public property; there can be no novelty thereafter to justify
the grant of a monopoly.
Constructive abandonment is traceable directly to the early patent stat-
utes which included as an element a limited consideration of the intent of
the inventor towards his invention. Constructive abandonment now ex-
cludes any consideration whatsoever of the mental element of abandonment
and regards only the length of time that the public has possessed the subject
matter as part of the prior art. If an invention has been in the prior art
for two years, it is conclusively presumed to be abandoned and not patentable
on an application filed thereafter. The prior art in questions of constructive
abandonment is determined in the same manner as in questions of novelty
with the possible exception that a United States patent in questions of
abandonment is considered to become prior art on its sealing or issuing
date instead of its filing date.
1 3
Constructive abandonment appears to be a deep principle or doctrine
which is slowly taking form in the patent law. It first appeared in the form
of statutory bars to the filing of applications for a patent after the invention
had been in the prior art for a two-year period. It spread later to the
amendment of a patent or application and restricted a reissue, a divisional
application, or an amendment copying claims from issued patents, to a two-
year period after the subject matter had become prior art, unlesg special
III. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 352 (881) ; Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354,
361 (1884); Ely Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 62 F. (2d) 524, 526 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933) ("That which is described and not claimed in a patent is abandoned to the public unless
the inventor before the grant of the first patent has on file an application asserting the same
invention."); Vapor Car Heating Co. v. Gold Car Heat & L. Co., 296 Fed. 188 (S. D. N. Y.
192o). Cf. Underwood v. Gerber, 149 U. S. 224, 230, 231 (1893), as explained in Sandy
MacGregor Co. v. Vaco Grip Co., 2 F. (2d) 655, 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). But the abandon-
ment of a patent application is not an abandonment of the invention claimed therein. Euth
v. Oliver, 7o F. (2d) IIo (C. C. P. A. 1934) ; and a second application may be filed if not
barred by rule of res adjudicata. In re Becker, 74 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
112. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. A. § 3I (I929).
113. Stelos Co. v. Hosiery Corp., 72 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). See Milburn v.
Davis-Bournonville Co., 27o U. S. 390 (1926). Compare the rule in interference proceedings
which limits the prior art in questions of constructive abandonment or laches in presenting
claims to a consideration of patents only, thus narrowing the issue of priority. Hendrickson
& Nelson v. Ronning & Ronning, 76 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. P. A. I935).
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circumstances be shown justifying the delay.
114  This principle recognizes
that subject matter in the prior art should be freed from the threat of
future monopolistic restrictions after a reasonable period in the possession
of the public.
If an invention is not patented, the free use of the public should not
be disturbed after two years; if it is patented, the patentee, his assignees,
licensees and grantees should not be disturbed. In order that a new idea
may be fully developed in use without apprehension of further monopolistic
rights, the public is invited by this principle to regard a two-year period
in the prior art as a limit beyond which further restrictions may not attach,
except in special circumstances shown as justification of the delay. A delay
of two years or more after subject matter became prior art must be justified
by a showing of special circumstances to sustain an amendment by a
reissue," 5 a divisional application, or a presentation of claims in a pending
application directed to this subject matter.
The doctrine of constructive abandonment may be summarized thus:
(I) After subject matter has been prior art for two years it is then
conclusively presumed to have been abandoned by all who have not pre-
viously filed patent applications disclosing that subject matter.
(2) But those who have filed such applications before the running
of the two-year period may further protect the subject matter originally
disclosed, by other claims introduced by amendment, provided the delay is
justified in the light of special circumstances." 6
CONCLUSION
This paper has been restricted to the basic principles on which an
invention is granted legal protection by the issuance of a patent; matters
concerning the patent itself, such as interpretation, infringement, and pro-
114. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350 (1881); Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U. S. 126
(192o) ; Webster v. Splitdorf Co., 264 U. S. 463 (1924). These restrictions apply only to
the reissue to broaden the patent.
115. The requirement of diligence (under the doctrine of laches) in the filing of a reis-
sue to broaden a patent is a later development and an added limitation to the reissue doctrine.
It should not be confused with constructive abandonment which was an earlier limitation
attached to the reissue right. Though a delay of less than two years need not be justified by
an affirmative showing of additional circumstances, an unreasonable delay of any length of
time after the error was or should have been discovered may invalidate a reissue under the
doctrine of laches. Today the requirement of diligence in the reissue doctrine seems to be
supplanting the doctrine of constructive abandonment as a much greater limitation on the doc-
trine.
116. See generally on this point Diamond Power Corp. v. Bayer Co., 13 F. (2d) 337 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Jeffery DeWitt Insulator Co., 22 F.
(2d) 277 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; Wagenhorst v. Hydraulic Steel Co., 27 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928); Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., 27 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928); General Motors Corp. v. Rubsam Corp., 65 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
But see Ex parte Byck and Peakes (Com. Dec.) 457 O~ncL.L GAz=rE PAT. OFF. 699
(1935), in which the significance of these principles is overlooked and the court refuses to
extend the doctrine of laches in the presentation of claims to publications generally, and
Southgate v. Greene, 57 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. P. A. 1932) (magazine article no bar).
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cedure for obtaining a patent, have been put aside for separate treatment.
Patentability is after all simply a function of originality, novelty and utility.
In a real sense, abandonment is included in novelty, because what is aban-
doned is then in the public domain and hence no longer new. Novelty is
judged on a prior art composed of patents, publications and domestic public
uses, according to the legal standard of what is obvious to the average
skilled artisan. The public is protected in what it enjoyed and possessed
before the inventor's novel contribution; the progress of science and the
useful arts is promoted in a just manner by the grant of a limited monopoly
to the inventor on his novel contribution.
117
117. Mention should be made of a collateral limitation on patentability which is not to be
confused with the main requisites. Two patents to the same inventor claiming the same in-
vention might be cumulative and thus extend the monopoly on that invention. Consequently,
patentability is terminated so far as the invention claimed is concerned by the issuance of a
patent thereon. See STSINGHAw, Doum.= PATExNa (933). Further, the issuance of a
foreign patent tolls the inventor's rights to a domestic patent unless preserved by an applica-
tion filed within twelve months of the filing of his first foreign application. 32 STAT. 1225
(903), 35 U. S. C. A. §32 (1929).
